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INTERNATIONAL DISPERSION AND PROFITABILITY:  
AN INSTITUTION-BASED APPROACH 
This study examines the effect of international dispersion on profitability. We use an institution-based 
approach to propose that increases in international dispersion lead, on average, to profitability 
downturns. We also argue that this liability of foreignness will affect multinationals from infrastructure 
industries to a lesser extent because in these industries: 1) the importance of cultural fit in products is 
low; 2) firms possess regulatory expertise; and 3) firms have limited aggregation opportunities at the 
regional level. We test our hypotheses on a panel of Spanish listed firms (1986-2007). Our findings point 
to a negative linear relationship between international dispersion and profitability, which is flatter for 
infrastructure multinationals. These results contribute to a more context-based understanding of 
internationalization that highlights the shortcomings of establishing a dispersed international footprint. 
Keywords: Internationalization; profitability; liability of foreignness; regionalization; institution-based 
view; infrastructure firms. 
1 Introduction  
Assessing the performance consequences of multinationality is a key topic in the International 
Business (IB) literature (see Nguyen 2017 for a recent review). However, there are still “more questions 
than answers” (Glaum and Oesterle 2007). Firms that venture beyond domestic borders can capitalize on 
their firm-specific assets (e.g. Buckley and Casson 1976; Caves 1971; Goerzen and Beamish 2003); 
access new resources (Benito 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2015); achieve economies of scale and scope 
(e.g. Contractor et al. 2003; Hennart 2007; Miller et al. 2016; Tallman and Li 1996); and exploit arbitrage 
opportunities (Allen and Pantzalis 1996; Ghemawat 2007; Kogut 1985). Nonetheless, the profitability of 
multinational firms can be seriously compromised by the so-called liability of foreignness (LoF); that is, 
the additional costs in which multinationals incur because of the disadvantageous position that they hold 
in host markets compared to domestic incumbents (Hymer 1976; Zaheer 1995).  
The literature on the LoF has acknowledged its multifaceted nature (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2007; 
Eden and Miller 2001). As such, some scholars have tried to refine our understanding of the concept by 
unpacking its triggers. For instance, Eden and Miller (2004) argue that the LoF arises from the 
unfamiliarity, relational and discriminatory hazards that multinationals are bound to face in foreign 
countries due to factors such as cultural and regulatory differences. Rugman and Verbeke (2007) go one 
step further and claim that costs of operating abroad are even higher when multinationals expand to 
another region, giving rise to the liability of interregional foreignness (LoIF). This additional obstacle 
may be the reason why some multinationals prefer to constrain their geographic reach to their home region 
at the expense of achieving global benefits, as the regionalization literature suggests (e.g. Oh and Li 2015; 
Rugman and Verbeke 2004). However, a clear-cut distinction among regions obviates the potential co-
existence of similarities and differences within and across them (Dunning et al. 2007). Integrating the 
different conceptualizations of the LoF, Asmussen and Goerzen (2013) identified three different 
ramifications: cultural, institutional, and regional. They argued that the main costs that multinationals face 
when expanding abroad vary according to the dispersion of their locations across cultures, institutional 
settings, and regions. However, a comparative analysis of the impact of each of these dimensions of 
international dispersion on firm profitability has not been carried out so far.  
We contribute to fill this gap not only by analyzing how each of these dimensions affects firm 
profitability, but also by examining the extent to which cross-industry differences moderate these 
relationships. Zhou and Guillén (2016) found that firms choose the type of foreign direct investments 
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(FDI) that they undertake based on different country distance dimensions to minimize the impact of the 
LoF. This result suggests that some heterogeneity might exist in the relationship between the LoF and 
profitability at the firm or industry levels. Therefore, new research on the topic should determine the 
circumstances under which firms and/or industries may be less affected by the LoF. For this reason, we 
aim to answer the following research question: how does international dispersion affect the profitability of 
infrastructure firms1 compared to that of their non-infrastructure counterparts? Although previous studies 
propose that infrastructure firms have an ability to navigate through different institutional contexts 
(Bonardi 2004; Guillén and García-Canal 2010; Henisz 2003), the performance implications of their 
internationalization decisions have not been analyzed yet. We claim that these industries are less affected 
by the cultural, regulatory and regional dimensions of the LoF because for them 1) the importance of 
cultural fit in products is low; 2) their regulatory expertise facilitates navigating through different 
regulatory environments; and 3) there are limited aggregation opportunities at the regional level. We 
explain each of these points in more detail in subsequent sections. 
Adopting an institution-based view angle (e.g. Peng 2002; Peng et al. 2008; Peng et al. 2009), we 
hypothesize that the profitability of multinationals decreases, on average, as their operations become more 
internationally dispersed. We also expect this relationship to be flatter for infrastructure multinationals. 
We test our hypotheses on a panel-data sample of Spanish listed firms (1986-2007). Our results reveal that 
higher degrees of international dispersion diminish profitability. By contrast, operating in infrastructure 
industries buffers the negative consequences of that higher dispersion, thus validating the arguments in 
favor of a flatter relationship between both variables. In fact, our findings show that infrastructure 
multinationals are even able to profit from venturing outside the boundaries of their home region. 
Therefore, it seems that these multinationals are better prepared to operate in different countries and 
regions. 
We add to the existing literature in a variety of ways. First, we shed more light on the relationship 
between internationalization and performance by analyzing the multifaceted impact of the LoF on 
profitability. Second, we extend the institution-based view to make an initial attempt at empirically testing 
the factors that make some multinationals better able to mitigate the negative effects of managing their 
international footprint across borders. We do so by focusing on the different profitability consequences of 
international dispersion in infrastructure and non-infrastructure multinationals. This also responds to the 
call for a more context-based understanding of the outcomes of internationalization (e.g. Bausch and Krist 
2007; Kim et al. 2015). Finally, our results add to the regionalization debate by confirming that we 
currently live in a semi-globalized world where regional borders still matter for most firms (Flores et al. 
2013; Ghemawat 2003, 2005, 2007; Kim and Aguilera 2015; Rugman and Verbeke 2004, 2007). 
Our findings carry important implications for managers, governments and policymakers. Despite 
the largely shared perception that multinationals should follow global strategies to pursue global 
opportunities (Verbeke and Asmussen 2016), managers should be aware that there is still a long way 
ahead for multinationals to fully profit from scattering their operations across different national and 
regional contexts even if it is true that some multinationals are in a better position to achieve it. Actually, 
multinationals are starting to display a higher caution in their foreign expansion. What The Economist 
calls “the retreat of the global company”2 is just a reaction of many multinational companies to the high 
 
1 Based on Fernández-Méndez et al. (2015), we define infrastructure firms as those operating in electricity, water, 
oil, gas, transportation, telecommunications, and construction. 




costs of operating at a global scale, and should challenge governments and policymakers to rethink their 
attitude towards FDI. 
2 Conceptual Background 
The literature on internationalization and performance—commonly measured as profitability—has 
drawn the attention of numerous scholars throughout the years. Early studies focused mostly on examining 
the relationship between degree of internationalization and profitability, albeit with inconclusive results 
(see Nguyen 2017 for a recent review).3 Research on the topic has unearthed positive linear performance 
effects (e.g. Grant et al. 1988; Vernon 1971) as well as nonlinear patterns in the form of a U (e.g. Capar 
and Kotabe 2003; Lu and Beamish 2001), an inverted U (e.g. Geringer et al. 1989; Hitt et al. 1997), an S 
(e.g. Benito-Osorio et al. 2016; Contractor et al. 2003; Riahi-Belkaoui 1998) and, even, an M (e.g. 
Almodóvar and Rugman 2014).  
Some authors have explained these mixed findings based on the different definitions of 
internationalization used in the literature (e.g. Verbeke and Forootan 2012; Wiersema and Bowen 2011). 
Constructs such as foreign sales over total sales (FSTS), foreign assets over total assets (FATA), and 
number of operations do not account perfectly for the degree of dispersion of the multinationals’ foreign 
footprint. As an example, two firms having the same amount of foreign operations could differ in the 
number and proximity of international markets entered. 
To overcome this limitation, several studies have proxied the scope of internationalization either 
by a country count (e.g. Lu and Beamish 2001; Tallman and Li 1996) or an entropy index that considers 
both the number of national markets where multinationals operate and how important they are to them 
(e.g. Hitt et al. 1997). Nonetheless, these variables continue to neglect the inherent characteristics of each 
of the countries. To account for this fact, one should look at the international dispersion4 rather than the 
degree of internationalization.  
For this reason, current research is more concerned with the extent to which multinationals can 
successfully operate at a global scale. Challenging the existence of a flat world (Friedman, 2005), several 
studies have found that the LoIF tends to diminish profitability when expanding beyond the home region 
due to the increased complexity and costs (e.g. Mendoza et al. in press; Oh and Contractor 2014; Rugman 
and Verbeke 2007). This is particularly salient in the regions often identified in the regionalization 
literature (e.g. Banalieva et al. 2012; Rugman and Verbeke 2004, 2008; Verbeke et al. 2016), which 
conform the so-called Triad; namely, European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and Asia Pacific. 
However, this research stream ignores that there can be varying degrees of intra and interregional 
heterogeneity (Galán and González-Benito 2006), especially in institutional terms. For instance, although 
Spain and Germany are both members of the EU, they do not share the same cultural traits (Ronen and 
Shenkar 2013) or legal system (La Porta et al. 1998). This is an important limitation, as recent works by 
Banalieva and Robertson (2010), Chao and Kumar (2010), Konara and Shirodkar (2018), Shirodkar and 
Konara (2017) and Wu and Salomon (2016) evidence that institutions play a crucial role in the 
profitability that multinationals ultimately achieve.   
 
3 Please note that in this paragraph we have only featured those works defining performance in terms of profitability. 
However, additional papers have used either market measures (e.g. Collins 1990; Michel and Shaked 1986) or a 
combination of both market and accounting measures (e.g. Dittfeld 2017; Lu and Beamish 2004; Thomas and Eden 
2004) as their dependent variables of performance. 
4 For the purposes of this study, we follow Asmussen and Goerzen’s (2013) definition of dispersion; that is, the 
extent to which the international operations differ in their proximity to the home base of the focal multinational. 
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To capture the effect of both geographic and institutional differences on profitability, other 
researchers such as Miller et al. (2016) have calculated a factor containing Ghemawat’s dimensions of 
cultural, administrative, geographic and economic distance (2001). Although this measure paints a more 
complete picture of how cross-national differences affect profitability, it does not unpack the nuanced 
effect of each element of distance. For this reason, and taking the above into account, in the remaining of 
the paper we set to examine how different facets of the LoF (cultural, regulatory and regional) affect firm 
profitability as well as the industry characteristics that make firms better able to face the downsides of 
internationalization.  
3 Hypotheses 
Host country institutions are one of the defining contextual elements of the profitability of 
multinationals (Peng et al. 2009). Particularly, cross-country institutional differences are one of the 
reasons behind differentials in performance among multinationals (Bamiatzi et al. 2016; Carney et al. 
2019; Makino et al. 2004). Institutions set the rules of the game for firms, defining the type of practices 
that are accepted and welcomed, both formally and informally (North 1990).  
Informal institutions encompass the customs, values and norms that shape human behavior (North, 
1991). Culture often serves as a proxy of informal institutions (e.g. Arregle et al. 2016; Estrin et al. 2016; 
Holmes Jr. et al. 2013). Prior literature has offered a wide range of definitions of the concept of culture, 
which has evolved over time (Beugelsdijk et al. 2017). In this paper, we conceive culture as a shared set 
of values and social norms that is transmitted across generations and distinguishes the members of a group 
from others (Berry and Poortinga 2006; Hofstede and Bond 1988; Ronen and Shenkar 2013). Meanwhile, 
formal institutions comprise constitutions, laws and property rights (North, 1991). Differences in formal 
institutions are usually attributed to the legal origin of the countries (La Porta et al. 1998; North 1991). 
Previous studies have shown that the origin of legal systems impact the regulations governing countries 
(e.g. Botero et al. 2004; Djankov et al. 2002). Moreover, they affect economic and social outcomes (La 
Porta et al. 2004). 
Entering a new country thus requires multinationals to learn to play by the informal and formal 
rules of the game; that is, they need to understand the underlying cultural and regulatory principles leading 
the nation (Globerman and Shapiro 2009; Hitt et al. 2004; Luo and Peng 1999). This means increasing the 
number of institutional contexts they interact with (Keim and Hillman 2008; Meyer and Tran 2006), 
which facilitates the emergence of liabilities stemming from the lack of legitimacy in the host country as 
well as the difficulties in transferring and acquiring firm-specific assets and routines (Gaur and Lu 2007; 
Kostova 1999; Kostova and Zaheer 1999). In this regard, regional integration offers an opportunity for 
institutional harmonization that lessens variations across countries (Moschieri et al. 2014), while 
facilitating economic exchanges and aggregation opportunities within the same region (Ghemawat 2007).  
 Certainly, a more globally dispersed footprint may bring benefits to multinationals in terms of 
arbitrage (Ghemawat 2007; Kogut 1985) and learning opportunities (Zhou and Guillén 2015). 
Nevertheless, the above arguments suggest that entering new institutional contexts also aggravates the 
LoF (Hymer 1976; Zaheer 1995). As previously mentioned, we operationalize international dispersion by 
considering the three dimensions of the LoF identified by Asmussen and Goerzen (2013): intercultural, 
interregulatory, and interregional.5 Drawing from the institution-based view (e.g. Peng 2002; Peng et al. 
2008; Peng et al. 2009), we expect that, on average, the increased costs of internationalization stemming 
 
5 Compared to Asmussen and Goerzen (2013), we relabel the institutional elements as regulatory to avoid any 
potential confusions. We do so because the institution-based view considers that both culture and regulations are part 
of the institutional context of a country (North 1990). 
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from institutional barriers and cross-country differences will outweigh its benefits since the former are 
much more certain than the latter. In other words, multinationals will always be required to address 
institutional differences, but the expected synergies of the international expansion cannot be taken for 
granted. In this regard, some multinationals may be overconfident in their ability to capture synergies from 
the increased dispersion of their foreign presence (Picone et al. 2014) or may just follow wrong strategies 
(Rumelt 2011).  
On this basis, we propose that multinationals will be better shielded against the LoF if they operate 
in industries where: 1) the importance of cultural fit in products is low; 2) firms possess regulatory 
expertise; and 3) there are limited aggregation opportunities at the regional level. As noted earlier, we 
argue that infrastructure industries fit this description.  
3.1 Importance of cultural fit  
Even though expanding to diverse locations may widen multinationals’ learning opportunities 
(García-García et al. 2017; Gomez-Mejia and Palich 1997; Morosini et al. 1998), the dominant view in the 
IB literature is that internationalizing to culturally diverse countries is detrimental to performance due to 
the increased complexity and costs that it entails (Beugelsdijk et al. 2018). The more dissimilar the 
cultures where multinationals operate, the harder it is to share common practices (Kostova et al. 2018) and 
know-how (Madhok 1997) across locations. Moreover, cultural differences complicate gaining social 
legitimacy in comparison with local incumbents (Zaheer 1995), which makes it harder to convince 
customers to switch their purchases from them to foreign newcomers. Cultural differences with the end 
customers are particularly important in industries where firms sell products defined by cultural attributes 
(Ghemawat 2001) as well as in those where there are close relationships between firms and customers 
(Javalgi et al. 2014). 
The exit of Idilia Foods from the Chinese market provides a good illustration of the difficulties of 
operating in countries with differing cultural norms and values.6 The Spanish food group Nutrexpa (now 
divided into Adam and Idilia Foods) entered China in 1990 encouraged by the size of the country’s 
potential customer base. They chose to go in the market with Cola-Cao, a cocoa preparation for hot milk 
that has been one of their star products in the home market for over 70 years. To increase their likelihood 
of success in China, they adapted and rebranded the product with the phonetically similar name 
GaoLeGao (meaning “happy, tall, happy”). Despite all the efforts, they faced enormous difficulties in the 
country, arising from the misfit between their products and the Chinese consumption patterns. By the time 
they got it right with sweet snacks, the product was so different from the rest of their portfolio that they 
decided to sell their Chinese venture to the Filipino company Liwayway and exit the market in 2015.  
As Joan Cornellà (former General Manager of Cola-Cao Food Tianjin Ltd.) once explained, “the 
cost of learning has been very high. We have been here for 22 years and nowadays, if we had to change, 
of course we would change many things because we have already done the learning. When we entered, we 
did not take into account either the big cultural differences (between China and Spain) or the consumption 
patterns of Chinese consumers, and nowadays with all these lessons I think we would not need to “waste” 
so much time studying the market in depth, but we would correct many mistakes that we have made.”7  
Based on the above arguments, we expect to find a negative linear relationship between 
intercultural dispersion and profitability; that is, operating across different national cultures results in 
 
6 Example extracted from: Cola Cao abandona China: Idilia Foods vende su planta de GaoLeGao al filipino 
Liwayway, La Vanguardia, 17 December 2015. 
7 Nutrexpa in China, ICEX, 13 June 2013. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IAAv8pcZfvQ. Last 
accessed 6 September 2019. 
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lower profitability when multinationals enter new markets due to the increased costs and complexity. 
Hence, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 1: Intercultural dispersion reduces profitability. 
Ghemawat (2001) suggests that infrastructure firms are not particularly affected by cultural 
differences due to the nature of their products. They need to be granted a license or contract—or acquire 
another firm that has them—to operate both at home and abroad (Bonardi 2004; Fernández-Méndez et al. 
2015; Henisz 2003); and governments tend to grant contracts and licenses to foreign firms based on 
project execution skills rather than cultural affinity. Project execution skills involve the ability to plan and 
execute large-scale projects in a timely fashion by integrating and adapting the technologies and 
subsystems provided by other firms (Amsden and Hikino 1994). This is particularly vital in developing 
countries, where governments are concerned with properly filling infrastructure voids to foster economic 
development (Fernández-Méndez et al. 2015).  
The importance of project execution skills instead of cultural fit is highlighted in the international 
expansion of the Spanish infrastructure company Acciona, which has projects scattered all around the 
globe. José Valén (Contract Manager and Tender Director at Acciona) knows about the relevance of doing 
things properly, especially in difficult international markets with significant cultural differences: “We 
(people in business development) first go into an uncharted territory, very aggressive, very protective. 
Nobody likes outsiders coming to the market with new ideas. Winning the contract is easy, but then you 
have to carry out the job. And when you have managed to finish the first contact and you can demonstrate 
that you can walk the talk and they can see the finished infrastructure on site, that is when we show that 
we can do it and we can do it well”.8 Taking all these arguments into account, we suggest that: 
Hypothesis 2: The negative linear relationship between intercultural dispersion and profitability 
is flatter for infrastructure firms. 
3.2 Degree of regulatory expertise  
Apart from culture, formal institutions also affect the possibilities that multinationals have of 
succeeding in foreign markets. Different regulations provide arbitrage opportunities that multinationals 
can exploit to their own benefit (Jackson and Deeg 2008; Konara and Shirodkar 2018; Mallon and 
Fainshmidt 2017). Furthermore, greater regulatory dispersion sends positive signals to investors, 
especially when multinationals venture into countries with strong creditor rights (Gande et al. 2009). Yet 
scholars often find that dealing with distant formal institutions is bound to have a negative impact on 
profitability (Banalieva and Robertson 2010; Shirodkar and Konara 2017; Wu and Salomon 2016). As 
regulatory dispersion increases, so do the obstacles in transferring the accumulated knowledge to host 
countries (Fernández-Méndez et al. 2018; Konara and Shirodkar 2018; Kostova and Roth 2002; Rangan 
and Sengul 2009). In addition, business practices are usually developed under a specific legal system. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of these practices can be compromised when firms venture into countries with 
a different legal system.  
Crimidesa, the world’s largest sodium sulfate exporter, learned this lesson the hard way.9 The 
Spanish multinational set up a joint venture in the Chinese district of Hongze with some local authorities 
and a Chinese group to exploit a sodium sulfate deposit and run a factory. After two years and a ten-
million-dollar investment, they discovered that their Chinese partners had never transferred the mining 
 
8 La financiación es el gran reto de las constructoras en el exterior, El Economista, 3 October 2015. 
9 Example extracted from: Aprender a hacer negocios en China, El País, 26 June 2005; and Cuentos y cuentas en 
China, El País, 22 May 2005. 
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rights to them. Even though Crimidesa ended up recovering most of their investment, they felt swindled 
by the Hongze authorities. The issues mainly stemmed from contracts in China not being as binding as in 
Western economies—something the Spanish multinational was not aware of.  
As a result of the differences between regulations, learning pressures are bound to increase, 
particularly for those multinationals that are not conversant in dealing with governmental actors. Given the 
difficulties in generating and transferring regulatory knowledge, we submit that: 
Hypothesis 3: Interregulatory dispersion reduces profitability. 
Foreign governments often scrutinize infrastructure firms more than those from other industries 
(Doh et al. 2004; Ramamurti 2003; Sawant 2010). Since governments assign projects through competitive 
bids, the ability of infrastructure firms to manage different regulatory contexts is paramount to obtain the 
best possible outcome from negotiations. Losing a bid implies losing a market opportunity, which is likely 
to impact the firm’s profitability negatively. However, winning a bid may not lead automatically to higher 
returns. If a high number of firms compete for a license or contract, the margins of the winning firm will 
tend to be lower (Athias and Nuñez 2008; Dyer and Kagel 1996). This will prompt the appearance of the 
so-called “winner’s curse” (Capen et al. 1971); that is, the highest bidder winning the bid at the expense of 
achieving poor or even negative returns. In addition, winning a bid does not guarantee success in the long 
run, especially in politically risky countries where the investments can be expropriated (Fernández-
Méndez et al. 2015; Henisz 2002; Sawant 2010). 
Although governmental control may deter the profitability of infrastructure firms by restricting 
their internationalization choices, it also gives them the expertise to deal with different formal institutions. 
Multinationals proficient in setting up lobbying campaigns and laying out influence strategies, especially 
if they have ties to other firms and individuals in the country, will emerge as winners (Henisz 2003). Their 
continuous interaction with different politicians and regulators will contribute to the development of a 
dynamic capability to adapt to new institutional environments. The success of the Spanish bus service firm 
ALSA (Automóviles Luarca, S.A.) in China, where the process of obtaining licenses is far more complex 
than in other countries, is a good illustration of this capability.10  
José Cosmen (founder of ALSA) discovered China’s need for more developed transportation 
services during a business trip to the country and decided to invest there in the 1980s. Back then, the 
Chinese government did not allow foreign firms to operate bus services, so ALSA could only offer taxi 
transportation services in Shenzen, and through a joint venture with local partners. The firm considered 
this operation a good opportunity to learn how to do business in China and build strong relationships not 
only with local partners, but also with governments and regulators. Andrés Cosmen—one of the sons of 
ALSA’s founder and the person responsible for the expansion of the multinational in China—highlights 
networking with Chinese partners and administrators as one of the reasons why they succeeded in the 
country (Cosmen 2004). Indeed, when in 1990 the Chinese government gave foreign investors the 
freedom to operate bus services, ALSA was fully prepared to take the next step. They set up new joint 
ventures and started offering services that the Chinese population had never seen before, such as regular 
schedules and modern coaches with comfortable seats. Nowadays, the multinational’s expertise in 
navigating the market has even motivated the creation of an import-export subsidiary whose mission is 
helping other multinationals operate in China.  
The case of ALSA in China shows that infrastructure firms are in a better position to navigate 
different institutional contexts than their non-infrastructure counterparts thanks to their frequent 
 
10 Example extracted from Guillén and García-Canal (2010). 
8 
 
interactions with regulators and government actors in their daily activities. Accordingly, we formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The negative linear relationship between interregulatory dispersion and 
profitability is flatter for infrastructure firms. 
3.3 Regional aggregation opportunities 
Regional integration softens institutional discrepancies between countries (Moschieri et al. 2014). 
Moreover, countries in regions such as the EU, NAFTA and Asia Pacific are close-by, which reduces the 
obstacles of geographic distance like travel, transportation, and coordination across time zones (Asmussen 
and Goerzen 2013). In turn, this facilitates delivering economies of scale by integrating operations at the 
regional level (Ghemawat 2007).  
Firms that have a taste for interregional expansion fail to reap the benefits of a higher institutional 
uniformity and geographic proximity. This, in turn, supports the negative impact of interregional 
expansion on firm profitability that researchers have often found in the existing literature (e.g. Almodóvar 
and Rugman 2014; Oh and Contractor 2014; Oh et al. 2015; Qian et al. 2010; Qian et al. 2013). The plans 
to move the production activities of Spanish fashion group Mango from Asia back to Europe are a good 
illustration of the obstacles that some multinationals face due to interregional dispersion. In the words of 
Daniel López (Vice President of the Spanish group): “Fast fashion is part of the DNA of our company 
and, to be more receptive in the market, we accepted to move in the near future part of the production 
from countries like China, Bangladesh and India to closer places such as Spain, Turkey and Italy.”11 All in 
all, given the difficulties that multinationals often face when spreading international operations across 
regions, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 5: Interregional dispersion reduces profitability. 
Infrastructure firms work on a project-by-project basis. This allows host governments to act as 
deal makers or deal breakers in their investments (Ramamurti 2003), shaping the market opportunities that 
they can pursue. For this reason, infrastructure firms often favor multidomestic strategies, negotiating 
entry and setting up operations in each country separately (Bonardi 2004). This one-country-at-a-time 
approach ultimately entails that infrastructure firms cannot easily split their value chain across locations 
(Bonardi 2004; Guillén and García-Canal, 2010). Consequently, they cannot fully benefit from the 
economies of scale of their foreign operations, which is one of the main advantages highlighted in prior 
studies examining the relationship between internationalization and performance (Abdi and Aulakh 2018). 
Moreover, each operation normally requires a larger deployment of resources as the firm has to build it up 
from scratch. 
Nonetheless, the lack of opportunities for integration of their activities at a regional level that we 
have previously described can also prove a favor in disguise. Despite restricting opportunities to take 
advantage of cost efficiencies, we expect that building the whole operation from scratch in each host 
country eases the coordination of foreign ventures due to the absence of links between countries that 
trigger the downsides of geographic distance. That is why the managers of these firms do not feel 
uncomfortable at all displaying multidomestic strategies. As the former CEO of Telefónica once said, “in 
this company we always say that we are not a multinational firm, but rather a multidomestic company, and 
 
11 Lopez (Mango): “Aumenteremo il reshoring in Spagna e Italia”, Pambianco News, 23 March 2017. 
9 
 
the message conveyed to each executive is precisely this one: we are a company deeply rooted in each of 
the countries in which we operate.”12 As such, we suggest that: 
Hypothesis 6: The negative linear relationship between interregional dispersion and profitability 
is flatter for infrastructure firms. 
4 Methods 
4.1 Sample 
Our sample comprises all non-financial Spanish firms listed in the Madrid Stock Exchange in 
1990 (n=103) over a 22-year span (1986-2007).13 We chose neither the research setting nor the timeframe 
arbitrarily. Spain offers a unique scenario to study the outcomes of international dispersion from an 
institutional perspective. Using this country to perform the analyses addresses concerns about varying 
degrees of intra and interregional institutional heterogeneity. For instance, as we mentioned before, Spain 
and Germany are both members of the EU. However, they do not share the same cultural traits (Ronen and 
Shenkar 2013) or legal system (La Porta et al. 1998). In addition, the Spanish context allows us to present 
a more complete picture of the consequences of international dispersion on profitability than alternative 
research settings given that Spanish outward FDI experienced a significant growth only after the country’s 
entrance in the European Economic Community (the current European Union) in 1986. We established 
2007 as the final year of our timeframe to counter any potential biases in the findings resulting from the 
2008 global financial crisis. 
To conduct our analyses, we retrieved the data on Spanish FDI operations from the Systematic 
Database on International Operations of Spanish Companies, developed under the sponsorship of the 
Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade, ICEX (see Guillén and García-Canal 2007). We also consulted other 
sources of information to build additional variables (e.g. COMPUSTAT, DATASTREAM, Thomson 
Reuters SDC Platinum, the Spanish Securities Market Commission online reports, news databases, and the 
websites of the firms included in our sample). 
4.2 Analytical Approach 
In this paper, we focus on analyzing the effect of international dispersion on profitability and the 
extent to which cross-industry differences moderate this relationship. Because geographic diversification 
strategies are bounded to be affected by self-selection (e.g. Dastidar 2009), we accounted for this issue by 
implementing Heckman’s two-step estimation method (1979) using STATA 14. In the first step, we 
estimated a robust panel-data probit to predict if firm i was already internationalized in year t.14 We then 
calculated the inverse Mills ratio, which we introduced as a control variable for self-selection in the 
second stage (robust random-effects regressions).  
This second stage only comprises observations from firms operating abroad and, specifically, for 
the years when they are internationalized. For this reason, whereas the first stage includes 1,179 firm-year 
observations and 103 firms, the second one consists of 689 firm-year observations and 62 firms. We 
describe in more detail the measures that we use in our analysis in the following subsections. We lagged 
one period all independent and control variables to account for potential reverse causality issues and to 
better capture the effect of international dispersion on profitability (Wan and Hoskisson 2003). 
 
12 César Alierta, CEO of Telefónica, Diario 155, 26 June 2001, p. 21. 
13 At this point, we shall note that our panel-data sample is not balanced. Some of the companies included in our 
study got delisted or merged during the period of analysis. In addition, there are some non-systematic missing 
observations. 
14 A previous version of this first stage appears on García-García et al. (2017).  
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4.3 First-stage variables: the internationalization decision 
The dependent variable in the first stage aims to capture whether a firm i had any FDI stock within 
a certain year t. We proxy it with a dummy that takes the value of one if the firm had invested abroad from 
1986 to the end of year t, and zero otherwise. Following Dastidar (2009), we regressed our dependent 
variable on the lagged values of firm and industry characteristics. We also introduced a year control to 
account for the specific year of the observation.  
At firm level, we include the following variables:15 size (total sales); proprietary technology 
(number of patents accrued by the firm since the year of its establishment); leverage (long-term debt to 
total assets); liquidity (cash and cash equivalents to total liabilities); operating margin (EBIT/Sales); 
mergers (accumulated number of mergers the firm had gone through since its founding);16 firm age 
(number of years since inception); family ownership (percentage of stock held by the founder and/or their 
family); percentage of stock owned by the firm’s Board; percentage of stock owned by the Spanish 
government; and a dummy denoting whether the CEO was also the Chairman of the board of directors of 
the firm.   
At the industry level we include the firm’s global mimetic behavior, defined as the percentage of 
firms that are geographically diversified within an industry in a certain year. Furthermore, we use a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm operates in infrastructure industries, and zero 
otherwise.17 As previously mentioned, we follow Fernández-Méndez et al. (2015) and consider to be 
infrastructure firms those operating in electricity, water, oil, gas, transportation, telecommunications, and 
construction. This categorization is also consistent with the bulk of research analyzing infrastructure firms 
(Guthrie 2006; Kirkpatrick et al. 2006; Parker 2003; Ramamurti and Doh 2004; Sawant 2010). It should 
be noted that construction firms are featured in this category because most of their activities revolve 
around the development and operation of large state-funded infrastructure projects (Fernández-Méndez et 
al. 2015; Grimsey and Lewis 2007: 2). We classified the remaining industries as non-infrastructure—other 
soft services;18 other hard services;19 food and drink; iron and steel; machinery and equipment; building 
materials; chemical products and medical equipment; and stationery and office supplies. We also include 
dummies to account for the focal firm’s primary industry of operation.  
4.4 Second stage: international dispersion and profitability  
In the second stage we use profitability as our dependent variable. We define profitability as the 
firm’s return on assets (ROA). This measure is the most commonly used in studies analyzing the 
performance outcomes of internationalization (e.g. Abdi and Aulakh 2018; Lu and Beamish 2001; Miller 
et al. 2016; Ruigrok et al. 2007). To smooth out yearly fluctuations, we calculated a three-year moving 
 
15 We retrieved the financial data from COMPUSTAT, DATASTREAM, the Spanish Securities Market 
Commission, and the firms’ websites. We gathered the data on proprietary technology from ESPACENET. This 
platform is available online at https://worldwide.espacenet.com/ (Last accessed 6 September 2019). We extracted the 
data to build the ownership and management variables from press releases, directories (DICODI, DUNS, The 
Maxwell Espinosa Shareholders Directory), and the works of Vergés (1999, 2010). 
16 This variable only includes domestic mergers with other companies from our sample. We ran a robustness test by 
excluding the firms involved in mergers from our regressions. The pattern of results remained unchanged. We do not 
report the findings due to space restrictions. However, they are available upon request. 
17 We exclude firms operating in banking and financial services from our analyses because they normally have 
specific accounting standard (Lemmon and Lins 2003). 
18 We define soft services as those that require simultaneous production and consumption. Consequently, the firm 
and the customer base must be co-located (Guillén and García-Canal 2010). 
19 Hard services are those in which production and consumption can be separated. Therefore, they can be exported at 
arm’s length (Erramili 1990). 
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average of ROA at time t-1, t, and t+1, as previously done by authors such as Chang and Rhee (2011) and 
García-García et al. (2017).  
Our key explanatory variable is international dispersion. We followed Asmussen and Goerzen 
(2013) to operationalize this variable, thus considering intercultural, interregulatory, and interregional 
dispersion. We chose clusters over continuous distance measures because Asmussen and Goerzen (2013) 
and Gupta et al. (2002) contend that country clusters offer a good summary of interinstitutional and 
interregional similarities and differences.  
We measure intercultural dispersion as the number of different cultural blocs where multinationals 
operate. We specify said cultural blocs based on the classification developed by Ronen and Shenkar 
(2013). Specifically, we used the 11 global clusters that these authors found in their study; namely, Arab, 
Near East, Latin America, East Europe, Latin Europe, Nordic, Germanic, African, Anglo, Confucian, and 
Far East. We exclude from the definition of the variable Spain’s home cultural bloc; namely, Latin 
Europe. 
We calculate interregulatory dispersion as the number of different regulatory blocs where 
multinationals operate. We relied on the classification of legal systems by La Porta et al. (1998) to 
delineate them. According to their work, we created six categories: British common-law, French civil-law, 
German civil-law, Scandinavian civil-law; socialist, and mixed legal system. Mirroring our definition of 
intercultural dispersion, we do not account for Spain’s home regulatory bloc; namely, French civil-law. 
We focus on legal systems because former studies have found that countries with the same legal origin 
possess similar regulations (Botero et al. 2004; Fernández-Méndez et al. 2015).  
Regarding interregional dispersion, we define it as the number of different regional clusters where 
multinationals operate outside of Spain’s home region. According to the Triad region classification used in 
previous studies (e.g. Oh and Contractor 2014; Rugman and Verbeke 2004; Verbeke et al. 2016), we 
consider Spain’s home region to be the EU. Specifically, we consider that Spain’s core region is the EU-
15. To account for all the destinations of the Spanish FDI, we added a category named “Other” to the two 
remaining blocs of the Triad (i.e. NAFTA and Asia Pacific).  
Our moderating variable is the same dummy that we used in the first stage, which takes the value 
of one if the firm operates in infrastructure industries, and zero otherwise. Table 1 summarizes the levels 
of international presence and dispersion displayed by the multinationals in our sample according to the 
industry where they operate. The table contains information about the number of firm-year observations 
belonging to domestic and multinational firms. It also presents the mean and standard deviations of the 
multinationals’ international intensity (number of foreign operations carried out), international scope 
(number of countries entered) and each of the three dimensions of international dispersion for each 
industry, the infrastructure and non-infrastructure subsamples, and the overall sample. We can observe 
that infrastructure firms tend to favor expanding beyond domestic borders, undertaking more foreign 
investments and venturing into more countries. Furthermore, their international footprint is more dispersed 
across cultural, regulatory and regional clusters than that of their non-infrastructure counterparts. 
Particularly, construction multinationals seem to have a taste for dissimilar countries. At the other 
extreme, multinationals operating within the categories of “Other soft services” and “Stationery and office 
supplies” display some of the lowest levels of international dispersion in the sample.  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 




To rule out alternative explanations, we added some firm-level variables included in the first stage 
as controls in our second-stage regressions: size; proprietary technology; leverage; liquidity; operating 
margin; family, Board and state ownership; CEO duality; and firm age. Since prior works have found a 
close link between international experience and profitability (Goerzen and Beamish 2005), we also added 
the number of years that a firm had been operating abroad. Additionally, we introduced a variable to 
control for the entry modes used by firms when expanding abroad and defined it as the percentage of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. Furthermore, we entered the inverse Mills ratio as a control for self-selection. 
Finally, we included year and industry dummies as controls in all our models.  
Table 2 exhibits the correlations and descriptive statistics of the main variables included in this 
second stage. As can be extracted from this table, there are no high correlations Therefore, 
multicollinearity does not seem to be an issue. Our Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) analysis further 
supports that there is no significant multicollinearity as all the mean VIF values of the regressions are well 
below the recommended cutoff value of 10 proposed by Kutner et al. (2004: 409). 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
5 Results 
Table 3 shows the robust panel-data probit of the internationalization decision. Because this stage 
is only instrumental in our core analysis, for the sake of brevity we only report the estimates. Nonetheless, 
it shall be noted that the Infrastructure industries variable is not significant, meaning that belonging to 
these industries does not make firms more prone to internationalization. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 4 reports the estimates from the second-stage robust random-effects regressions using three 
separate models that differ in the dimension of international dispersion included as independent variable: 
intercultural dispersion (Model I), interregulatory dispersion (Model II), and interregional dispersion 
(Model III). Instead of entering these three variables in a sole model, we used three separate ones to 
prevent any biases from the high pairwise correlations between the three dimensions of international 
dispersion.  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the more cultural clusters that a multinational enters, the lower its 
profitability (β = -0.773, p = 0.029). This relationship is flatter for infrastructure multinationals (β = 0.729, 
p = 0.029), in line with Hypothesis 2. We also find support for Hypotheses 3 and 4 in that there is a LoF 
when operating across different regulations (β = -1.499, p = 0.023) that infrastructure multinationals are 
more capable of managing (β = 1.483, p = 0.027). Similarly, the negative and significant coefficient of 
interregional dispersion (β = -1.154, p = 0.051) offers support for the LoIF discussed in Hypothesis 5. 
Once again, infrastructure multinationals seem to be better equipped to handle an increased interregional 
presence (β = 1.589, p = 0.004), as we argue in Hypothesis 6.  
Figures 1 to 3 illustrate the moderating effects included in our regressions. Figure 1 shows that 
increasing the number of cultural clusters where multinationals operate leads to the emergence of an 
intercultural LoF, being this liability less acute for infrastructure multinationals. The same applies to the 
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negative relationships between interregulatory dispersion and profitability depicted in Figure 2. The 
positive effect displayed for infrastructure multinationals in the different interactions is even more 
pronounced in Figure 3, which presents the effect of interregional dispersion on profitability. In it we can 
see that the negative relationship between interregional dispersion and profitability observed for non-
infrastructure firms turns into a positive one for infrastructure firms. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Figures 1 to 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
To conclude this section, it would be interesting to review the significance of our control 
variables. Our estimates indicate that the operating margin has a consistent positive effect on profitability. 
By contrast, proprietary technology seems to have a negative impact on the returns achieved by the firms. 
Finally, our inverse Mills ratio is negative and significant across all models, thus emphasizing the need to 
control for self-selection in the study. 
6 Robustness tests and additional analyses 
The findings presented in this study are robust to the redefinition of both the dependent and 
independent variables. Although we only report some of these estimates due to space restrictions, all of 
them are available from the authors upon request. First, we performed a robustness test by using ROAt 
(ROA in the current year) instead of ROAt-1,t,t+1 (three-year moving average of ROA) as our dependent 
variable in the second stage. Our estimates remained unchanged.  
Second, we reran our second-stage analysis applying Ghemawat’s CAGE framework (2001). To 
do so, we built a comprehensive independent variable encompassing cultural, administrative, geographic, 
and economic distances. Building on Campbell et al. (2012) and García-García et al. (2017), we used 
principal common factor analysis with varimax rotation to create a single measure of the weighted 
standard deviations of distance between Spain and their host country base. We defined geographic 
distance as the pairwise distance between the capitals of the countries (in kilometers). We specified the 
remaining distance dimensions using data extracted from the cross-national distance database developed 
by Berry et al. (2010).20 The single factor had an eigenvalue of 2.64 and accounted for 66.0% of the 
overall variance. Our original results held. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Third, we tested whether our findings were robust to the inclusion of the three dimensions of 
international dispersion (cultural, regulatory and regional) in the same model. Due to the high correlation 
between these dimensions, we once again conducted principal common factor analysis with varimax 
rotation to create a measure of overall international dispersion. The single factor had an eigenvalue of 2.40 
and accounted for 80.2% of the overall variance. The inclusion of the new international dispersion 
variable did not affect our results. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 




20 This database is available at the Penn Lauder CIBER webpage. 
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Fourth, one could argue that there may be different levels of dispersion across dimensions. In an 
additional robustness test, we created a measure containing the number of dimensions where the firm is 
more dispersed than the average of the sample. To build the variable, we first calculated the average 
intercultural, interregulatory, and interregional dispersions of the observations in our sample. For each 
international dispersion dimension, we then created a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm-
year observation was above the average, and zero otherwise. Finally, we added the firm-year observations 
of the three dummy variables, which returned an index ranging from 0 to 3. Once again, entering this 
variable did not alter our findings.   
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Fifth, our results were also robust to modifications in the definition of interregional dispersion. 
Since the EU welcomed new members during the period of our study, we ran a robustness check 
accounting for the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements. Furthermore, we refined the category “Other” that we 
had previously created to acknowledge those destinations outside the Triad by grouping the countries in 
the next categories: Africa, America (excluding NAFTA), Europe (excluding EU-15), and Asia (excluding 
Asia Pacific). Because interregional dispersion places a strong emphasis on coordination, we performed an 
additional test by specifying this variable as the percentage of the firm’s country portfolio outside of its 
home region (the higher the number of countries outside the home region, the harder it may be to 
coordinate operations). In all cases our results held. 
Finally, to account for a wider range of intangible assets, we changed our proprietary technology 
measure to a lagged Tobin’s q—calculated following Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) formula. Former studies 
have considered this ratio as an appropriate proxy of the value of the intangible assets of the firm (e.g. 
Berry 2006; Dowell et al. 2000; García-Canal and Guillén 2008; Villalonga 2004) as well as its future 
investment opportunities (e.g. Carow et al. 2004). Our findings were not altered. 
7 Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper adds to the debate on the limits of successful international expansion by examining the 
relationship between international dispersion and profitability. Traditionally under-researched, several 
authors have called for more contributions on this topic (e.g. Aguilera et al. 2015; Avloniti and Filippaios 
2018; Bae and Salomon 2010; Contractor 2007; Fortwengel 2017), especially taking into account that it is 
unrealistic to assume that it will impact all firms and/or industries equally (Zhou and Guillén 2016). Our 
main contribution is to show the existence of cross-industry differences in the relationship between 
international dispersion and profitability, being firms in infrastructure industries less affected by the LoF 
than the remaining ones. 
We operationalized international dispersion by considering the three dimensions identified by 
Asmussen and Goerzen (2013): intercultural, interregulatory, and interregional. Drawing from the 
institution-based view (e.g. Peng 2002; Peng et al. 2008; Peng et al. 2009), we suggest that, on average, 
the downsides of operating across different institutional contexts outweigh the benefits of international 
dispersion, thereby lowering profitability. Based on our theoretical framework, we would also expect 
infrastructure multinationals to be better equipped to face the LoF because they operate in industries 
where: 1) the importance of cultural fit in products is low; 2) firms possess regulatory expertise; and 3) 
there are limited aggregation opportunities at the regional level. 
Our results support the decline in profitability as multinationals increase the intercultural, 
interregulatory and interregional dispersion of their internationalization. However, our most important 
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result relates to the fact that infrastructure industries are less affected by any of the three LoF dimensions 
considered than the rest. Indeed, our core estimates show that infrastructure multinationals even profit 
from venturing outside the boundaries of their home region, thus challenging the existence of a LoIF in 
these industries. This finding is in line with those obtained from our additional analyses using CAGE and 
above-average international dispersion as our independent variables. In both cases infrastructure 
multinationals seem to gain from spreading their international presence. Taking these results as a whole, 
one could even say that instead of suffering from the LoF, infrastructure multinationals may benefit from 
what Mallon and Fainshmidt (2017) call an asset of foreignness. As we have previously mentioned, the 
difficulties in coordinating international operations across countries lead infrastructure multinationals to 
adopt multidomestic strategies. Paradoxically, this grants them more freedom to pursue profitable 
investment opportunities wherever they are, allowing them to benefit from international dispersion more 
than their non-infrastructure counterparts. 
It could be argued that our results are somewhat biased by the home region in our sample (the EU-
15), since the most profitable opportunities for the expansion of infrastructure firms are in the developing 
world; that is, outside the EU-15 (especially in Latin America, in the case of Spanish multinationals). To 
rule out this alternative explanation, we created two variables to rerun our regressions; namely, percentage 
of developing countries and percentage of developed countries outside the EU-15. 21 Our results confirm 
that increases in international dispersion both in developing countries and developed countries outside the 
EU-15 raise the profitability of infrastructure industries. Hence, the degree of development of the host 
countries of destination does not seem to be a factor affecting our results. We do not report these results 
due to space restrictions. Nonetheless, they are available from the authors upon request. 
Overall, our findings highlight the importance of putting the relationship between 
internationalization and profitability into context, which has been urged by Dittfeld (2017), Kim et al. 
(2015) and Liou and Rao‑Nicholson (2019), among others. In this regard, our paper focuses on industry-
level contingencies. However, we believe that our framework could be extended to the firm level by 
analyzing the firm attributes that reduce the LoF. For instance, the findings of Oh and Contractor (2014) 
suggest that product diversification mitigates the performance downturns that multinationals experience 
when expanding to foreign regions. More recently, Ral-Trebacz et al. (2018) have shown that marketing-
related FSAs can reduce the value erosion associated to interregional expansion. Our framework may help 
to integrate these results and develop new hypotheses at the firm level. The fact that previous research has 
found, on average, a negative relationship between international dispersion and profitability does not 
preclude that some firms may actually maintain or even increase their profitability levels when expanding 
abroad. For this reason, the factors identified in this study to counter the erosion of firm profitability in the 
international expansion (i.e. low importance of cultural fit in products; high regulatory expertise; and 
restricted opportunities for regional-level aggregation) can be useful for establishing criteria to guide the 
decisions of firms about whether to expand abroad or not. 
Apart from the academic contributions, our study also carries important managerial and policy 
implications. Our findings offer a performance-based explanation to why some firms avoid pursuing a 
global reach, as previously found by Fisch and Oesterle (2003), Osegowitsch and Sammartino (2008), and 
Rugman (2003), among others. Expanding to a wide variety of international settings offsets a series of 
 
21 We followed the UNCTAD and IMF classifications to categorize countries according to their degree of 
development. In the Developed category, we only included those countries considered as developed by both 
organizations. All other countries fell in the Developing category. It shall be acknowledged that all developing 
countries are located outside of the EU-15 boundaries. 
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costs that are hardly ever outweighed by the benefits of the foreign expansion and some multinationals are 
already realizing this. As a consequence, they have entered into “the prudent age of the multinational”, in 
which companies are more cautious about the scope of their international investments. 22 This will pose 
additional challenges for governments and policymakers to ensure that their countries are attractive 
destinations of foreign investments, especially at a time in which institutional complexity seems to be 
rising rather than declining because of events like Brexit or the threats of US pulling out of NAFTA. 
Despite the contributions and implications of our study, it also presents limitations. The first of 
these relates to the use of a single country setting to carry out our analyses. Although adopting a 
multicountry setting could have reinforced the external validity of our results, focusing on Spanish firms 
has the benefit of eliminating home-country variation as a confounding factor (Darandeli and Hill 2016). 
Besides, the bulk of Spanish foreign investments took place within the timeframe of the study, thus 
removing left-censoring issues. The second limitation emerges from data restrictions. A lack of access to 
primary data restricted the empirical operationalization of some of our arguments, such as those related to 
the pursuit of arbitrage opportunities. We were also unable to gather comprehensive data on the 
divestments of the multinationals in the host countries. Data restrictions also prevented us from studying 
the impact of within-country institutional differences and resources and capabilities on the profitability of 
international strategies.  
These limitations open interesting avenues for future research. For instance, scholars could further 
examine the link between arbitrage and international dispersion, and how it affects performance. They 
could also build on studies that examine within-country institutional variations (e.g. Kaasa et al. 2014; 
Taras et al. 2016) to address how they influence the profitability of multinationals. It would also be 
interesting to know more about entry modes and the role they play in alleviating or amplifying the LoF 
and its effect on performance. Additionally, new studies could extend the literature on resources and 
capabilities to the analysis of the relationship between international dispersion and performance since their 
value depends on the institutional environment of the country (Brouthers et al. 2008). Furthermore, future 
research could investigate the value of institutional capabilities. Although the whole set of factors that 
make firms from infrastructure industries less affected by institutional dispersion cannot be fully 
replicated by firms from other industries, the development of institutional capabilities may be. Recent 
research by Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2018) confirms that Latin American firms from a myriad of industries 
can perform better outside of their home region thanks to the uncertainty management capability 
developed by being exposed to political risk in their home country. All in all, we expect that our study 
contributes to additional research that refines our knowledge on the outcomes of internationalization. 
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Domestic Multinationals Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Infrastructure industries 71 211 38.91 37.32 16.07 11.27 4.31 2.24 1.59 1.12 1.96 0.78 
Energy and water 37 120 30.68 26.49 12.71 8.72 3.78 1.78 1.44 1.07 1.91 0.73 
Transportation and telecommunications 26 30 51.67 51.38 15.96 10.69 4.48 2.56 1.15 1.13 1.59 0.75 
Construction 8 61 48.89 43.68 22.65 13.09 5.25 2.57 2.11 1.05 2.25 0.81 
Non-infrastructure industries 347 550 8.24 8.86 5.51 5.17 2.32 1.67 1.06 0.86 1.35 1.03 
Other soft services 119 58 7.16 7.30 3.86 3.17 1.34 1.47 0.96 1.07 0.46 0.54 
Other hard services 3 98 11.48 11.45 7.96 6.80 2.77 1.62 0.97 0.92 1.41 0.92 
Food and drink 40 82 15.78 11.75 10.35 6.81 3.47 1.80 1.39 0.96 2.10 1.06 
Iron and steel 65 44 8.76 4.78 5.41 2.69 2.76 1.83 1.32 0.82 1.54 1.12 
Machinery and equipment 36 54 7.27 5.66 4.63 2.32 2.78 1.07 1.43 0.71 1.67 1.31 
Building materials 45 54 5.33 4.08 3.48 2.06 1.76 1.36 0.83 0.62 1.19 0.55 
Chemical products and medical equipment 9 122 3.86 3.84 3.00 2.18 1.75 1.43 0.84 0.68 1.16 0.88 
Stationery and office supplies 30 38 2.59 1.27 2.41 0.98 1.34 0.90 0.84 0.63 0.97 0.74 
All industries (overall sample) 418 761 16.92 25.30 8.50 8.81 2.89 2.05 1.21 0.97 1.53 1.00 





  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Profitability 7.26 7.89 1.00                  
2 Intercultural dispersion 2.89 2.05 -0.08 1.00                 
3 Interregulatory dispersion 1.21 0.97 -0.11 0.75 1.00                
4 Interregional dispersion 1.53 1.00 -0.07 0.78 0.63 1.00               
5 Infrastructure industries 0.28 0.45 0.05 0.44 0.25 0.27 1.00              
6 Size 2.40 5.62 0.07 0.47 0.28 0.28 0.54 1.00             
7 Proprietary technology 36.49 69.46 -0.03 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.45 1.00            
8 Leverage 0.14 0.12 -0.09 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.30 0.26 0.04 1.00           
9 Liquidity 0.41 4.25 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 1.00          
10 Operating margin 11.17 16.90 0.38 -0.10 -0.15 -0.14 0.21 0.06 -0.05 0.20 -0.01 1.00         
11 Family ownership 9.13 18.25 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.02 -0.11 -0.15 -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 1.00        
12 Board ownership 15.99 21.92 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11 0.00 -0.23 -0.18 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 0.10 1.00       
13 State ownership 3.24 13.87 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.12 0.14 1.00      
14 CEO duality 0.31 0.46 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.09 -0.21 -0.04 -0.10 -0.12 -0.07 0.08 1.00     
15 Firm age 69.40 37.79 -0.02 -0.08 -0.11 -0.04 0.22 0.09 0.10 0.17 -0.05 0.03 -0.18 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 1.00    
16 International experience 14.62 10.57 -0.02 0.39 0.26 0.31 0.09 0.26 0.03 -0.11 -0.04 -0.14 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 1.00   
17 WOS (%) 47.92 33.32 -0.22 -0.04 0.04 -0.11 -0.37 -0.22 0.04 -0.19 -0.06 -0.30 0.11 0.19 -0.16 0.07 -0.07 0.06 1.00  
18 Inverse Mills ratio 0.54 1.37 -0.14 -0.24 -0.13 -0.23 -0.20 -0.15 -0.19 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.26 -0.10 -0.02 1.00 














































Robust pval in parentheses 
















Operating margin 0.000 
 (0.757) 
Accumulated mergers 4.581* 
 (0.068) 
Firm age 0.024 
 (0.355) 
Family ownership 0.053 
 (0.106) 
Board ownership -0.010 
 (0.375) 
State ownership -0.025 
 (0.522) 
CEO duality -0.304 
 (0.534) 
Global mimetic behavior 0.054** 
 (0.012) 
Infrastructure industries -1.679 
 (0.597) 





Industry dummies Included 
  
Wald chi-sq 127.08*** 
 (0.000) 
Observations 1,179 
Number of firms 103 
Table 3 Internationalization decision (robust panel-data probit)a 
aThis table features the first stage of our Heckman analysis. The dependent variable is the 
internationalization decision (dummy taking the value of one if the firm had invested abroad from 
1986 to the end of year t, and zero otherwise). There are 1,179 observations of 103 firms across a 22-





Model I Model II Model III 
VARIABLES 
    
Intercultural dispersion -0.773**   
 (0.029)   
Interregulatory dispersion  -1.499**  
  (0.023)  
Interregional dispersion   -1.154* 
   (0.051) 
Infrastructure industries 0.357 -0.104 -0.873 
 (0.896) (0.969) (0.754) 
Intercultural dispersion x Infrastructure industries 0.729**   
 (0.029)   
Interregulatory dispersion x Infrastructure industries  1.483**  
  (0.027)  
Interregional dispersion x Infrastructure industries   1.589*** 
   (0.004) 
Size 0.139 0.143 0.128 
 (0.127) (0.110) (0.152) 
Proprietary technology -0.033** -0.035** -0.030** 
 (0.044) (0.039) (0.048) 
Leverage -5.875 -5.583 -6.111 
 (0.150) (0.169) (0.139) 
Liquidity -0.008 -0.008 -0.023 
 (0.634) (0.640) (0.219) 
Operating margin 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.186*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Family ownership 0.019 0.015 0.017 
 (0.256) (0.358) (0.330) 
Board ownership -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.526) (0.473) (0.470) 
State ownership -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.999) (0.958) (0.960) 
CEO duality 0.737 0.827 0.789 
 (0.420) (0.368) (0.429) 
Firm age -0.000 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.996) (0.925) (0.991) 
International experience 0.064 0.058 0.049 
 (0.201) (0.214) (0.299) 
WOS (%) 0.018 0.018 0.017 
 (0.250) (0.268) (0.244) 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.866** -0.819** -0.917*** 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.010) 
Constant 3.233 3.673* 4.143** 
 (0.113) (0.092) (0.036) 
    
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
    
Year dummies Included Included Included 
    
Wald chi-sq 669.29*** 815.04*** 722.16*** 
Table 4 International dispersion and profitability (robust random-effects regressions)a 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Observations 689 689 689 
Number of firms 62 62 62 
Robust pval in parentheses 











CAGE factor -1.309* 
 (0.077) 
Infrastructure industries 1.200 
 (0.655) 










Operating margin 0.183*** 
 (0.000) 
Family ownership 0.021 
 (0.218) 
Board ownership -0.016 
 (0.520) 
State ownership -0.002 
 (0.943) 
CEO duality 1.247 
 (0.233) 
Firm age -0.006 
 (0.792) 
International experience 0.061 
 (0.210) 
aThis table features the second stage of our Heckman analysis. The dependent variable is profitability 
(ROAt-1,t,t+1). There are 689 observations of 62 firms across a 22-year period (1986-2007). The number 
of firms diminishes from the first stage because we only consider the observations of multinational 
firms. We entered the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the first stage to control for potential 
endogeneity issues. We included robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity. 
Table 5 International dispersion and profitability (CAGE factor)a 
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WOS (%) 0.002 
 (0.899) 





Industry dummies Included 
  
Year dummies Included 
  
Wald chi-sq 718.67*** 
 (0.000) 
Observations 650 
Number of firms 61 
Robust pval in parentheses 











International dispersion factor -1.689** 
 (0.014) 
Infrastructure industries 2.254 
 (0.339) 










Operating margin 0.184*** 
 (0.000) 
Family ownership 0.018 
 (0.284) 
Board ownership -0.015 
 (0.487) 
State ownership -0.000 
Table 6 International dispersion and profitability (international dispersion factor)a 
aThis table features the additional test in which we replaced each dimension of international 
dispersion in the second stage of our Heckman analysis by a factor containing the dimensions in 




CEO duality 0.744 
 (0.429) 
Firm age -0.002 
 (0.929) 
International experience 0.066 
 (0.171) 
WOS (%) 0.019 
 (0.226) 





Industry dummies Included 
  
Year dummies Included 
  
Wald chi-sq 738.94*** 
 (0.000) 
Observations 689 
Number of firms 62 
Robust pval in parentheses 














Above-average international dispersion -0.973** 
 (0.011) 
Infrastructure industries 0.714 
 (0.774) 










Table 7 International dispersion and profitability (above-average international dispersion)a 
aThis table features the robustness test in which we replaced each dimension of international 
dispersion in the second stage of our Heckman analysis by an international dispersion factor. The 
dependent variable is profitability (ROAt-1,t,t+1).  
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Operating margin 0.186*** 
 (0.000) 
Family ownership 0.017 
 (0.304) 
Board ownership -0.014 
 (0.538) 
State ownership 0.005 
 (0.837) 
CEO duality 0.751 
 (0.435) 
Firm age 0.000 
 (0.993) 
International experience 0.057 
 (0.230) 
WOS (%) 0.020 
 (0.185) 





Industry and year dummies Included 
  
Wald chi-sq 753.97*** 
 (0.000) 
Observations 689 
Number of firms 62 
Robust pval in parentheses 













aThis table features the additional test in which we replaced each dimension of international 
dispersion in the second stage of our Heckman analysis by a measure containing the number of 
dimensions where the firm is more dispersed than the average of the sample. The dependent variable is 





























Figure 1. Impact of intercultural dispersion on profitability. 




Figure 3. Impact of interregional dispersion on profitability. 
